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I. Introduction
The revenue from capital income taxation as a fraction of total
government revenue has been declining in the past thirty years.
Nevertheless, the academic literature has been paying increasing attention
to the subject of capital income taxation, primarily because of the effects
on investment incentives. In a perfectly competitive world with no
uncertainty, and in the absence of any taxes, equilibrium would require that
investment projects at the margin would receive just the interest rate paid
to savers at the margin. In general, however, the government uses the tax
system both to generate revenue and to stimulate investment and
productivity. As a consequence, the returns to savers and investors
diverge, and the incentives facing them are obscured.
A careful investigation of these incentive effects should account for
corporate and personal taxes as well as for the interaction of the two.
This interaction is essential because, for example, interest payments are
deductible at the corporate level but are taxed in the hands of the personal
sector upon receipt. Therefore, the effective tax rate becomes a combined
function of personal and corporate taxes. Moreover, the relationship
between investment and taxation depends on corporate financial policy and on
the pattern of ownership of corporate securities. There is no unique cost
1—2 —
ofcapital to the corporate sector that is independent of ownership pattern
or of capital structure.
One study of the incentive effects of capital income taxes is the book
edited by King and Fullerton (1984, hereafter KF). They estimated marginal
effective tax rates in four countries with a common theoretical framework.
Using 1980 as a reference year, their interest focused on the international
comparisons offered by the different tax regimes. In this paper, we
concentrate on a slightly different issue. We apply the KF methodology to
the U.S. economy only, for the years 1980 through 1986. This time series
approach provides an illustration of the evolution of the tax treatment of
income from capital in our decade. In order to maintain strict
comparability of results with those of KF for 1980, and with those of other
researchers who apply the KF methodology to additional countries in more
recent years, we resist the urge to tinker with the model. We use exactly
the same computer programs that were used for the KF study. We collect tax
data and parameters for more recent years, but our results for 1980 exactly
match those in the book. We use the same set of 81 hypothetical projects,
the same weights, and the same assumptions about arbitrage and inflation.
We therefore concentrate on tax changes only.
The underlying model follows along the lines of Hall and Jorgenson
(1967) in finding the user cost of capital for each project. The net
private rate of return depends both on the source of finance used and the
category of ownership of the returns. The proportional difference between
the average of the pretax rate of return and the average of the posttax rate
of return weighted over all the hypothetical projects constitutes the
overall marginal effective total tax rate (METTR). An alternative approach
would be to measure effective tax rates by taking the ratio of observed—3—
taxes to income from existing investments. Although these "average"
effective tax rates would reflect adequately the cashf lows and tax burdens,
the METTRs are intended to capture the incentives to save and invest.' We
acknowledge the difficulties in using METTRs, as discussed for example in
Summmers (1987) or Bradford and Fullerton (1981), but we choose not to
review these complex issues in this paper. Instead, we proceed with a
previously discussed methodology from King and Fullerton (1984) to estimate
effective tax rates for 1980 through the Tax Reform Act of 1986. For each
year, we provide effective tax rates for the fully phased—in version of the
law as enacted.
We find that the overall marginal effective total tax rate fell from 37
percent in 1980 to 23 percent under post—transition 1981 law, and remained
low until 1986 when the fully phased—in tax rate increased to 42 percent.
Furthermore, it showed a moderate tendency to rise with inflation. We also
find that the individual rates were distributed more uniformly in 1986 than
in any other year. The biggest difference in effective tax rates, that
between debt financed projects and equity financed projects, was
substantially reduced by the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes
the underlying model. Section III provides detail on the parameters, the
tax provisions, and the data used. Section IV analyzes our findings, and
section V concludes.
'Many other differences between average and marginal effective tax rates are
discussed in Fullerton (1984).-4-
II. The Methodological Framework
The notation and methodology in this section follows King (1977) and
King and Fullerton (1984). Consider an economic environment in which there
is perfect competition, perfect mobility, and no uncertainty. A firm
contemplating a new investment project will, in equilibrium, equate the net
outlay to the present value of net returns. If the cost of the project is
one dollar, and the present discounted value of any grants or tax allowances
on the unit of investment is A, then the net outlay is
C—i—A . (1)
Assume that this dollar invested will generate returns whose nominal value
increases with inflation and decreases with the rate of depreciation. These
returns are then discounted at the firm's discount rate. Then the present
discounted value of the profit stream net of taxes is given by
(l—'r)MRR —drvir—(i—T)w (2 Vp+b—
'
wherer is the corporate tax rate, MRR the marginal rate of return, v the
proportion of inventories on original cost accounting (FIFO as opposed to
LIFO), wc the corporate wealth rate, ir the inflation rate, p the discount
rate and 6theexponential rate of economic depreciation. The dummy
variable d takes the value 1 (one) for inventories and 0 (zero) for
everything else.—5 —
Now,if the rate of return net of depreciation is
p=MRR—5 , (3)
and we set the net outlay C equal to the present value of net returns V,
then we can solve (1), (2) and (3) to get
[(1 —A)(p + S—ir)+ drvir]
p— ________________+w—S . (4)
(l—r)
C
Toderive an expression for A, we assume that grants and allowances for
investment take one of three forms: (1) standard depreciation allowances;
(2) immediate expensing or free depreciation; and (3) cash grants. The
proportion of the cost of an asset that is entitled to standard depreciation
allowances is denoted by f1, and the present value of tax savings from
standard depreciation allowances on a unit of investment is Ad. Note, also,
that Ad is the product of the statutory corporate rate, r, times the present
value of allowances, A. If f2 denotes the proportion of the cost of the
project qualifying for immediate expensing at the corporate rate, then the
tax savings from this write-off is f2r. Finally, suppose that the
proportion qualifying for grants is denoted by f3 and the rate of grant
(equivalent to a tax credit) is g. Then,
A—f1A+f2T+f3
. (5)
There is no need to restrict the sum of f1, f2, and f3 to unity since at
certain times it can exceed one. For example, an investment tax credit may
or may not reduce the basis for capital consumption allowances.-6-
Suppose r is the real interest rate and i =r-I-lris the nominal
interest rate. The relation between the nominal market interest rate and
the return to the saver depends on the tax treatment of personal income.
Since the tax law defines the tax base to include the receipt of nominal
interest income, the posttax rate of return to the saver is given by
s= (1 —m)(r+ ir) —ir —w , (6)
where m is the marginal personal tax rate on interest income, and w is the
personal wealth rate. Then the marginal effective total tax rate canbe
expressed as (p—s)/p, the tax wedge as a fraction of the pretax returns.
To complete the model, we have to link the firm's discount rate to the
market interest rate. This relationship will, in general, depend on the
source of finance. In the case of debt finance, where nominal interest
income is taxed but nominal interest payments are tax deductible,
p—i(l —r)
. (7)
For new share issues, a potential investor would require a net rate of
return equal to i(l —m) which reflects his opportunity cost. Then the
project should yield a return p such that the net of tax dividend yield
equals the individual's opportunity cost, p(l —m) =i(1—m). Hence, for
new share issues
p—i . (8)—7 —
Finally,for retained earnings, if z is the effective tax rate on accrued
capital gains, the project should yield a return p such that
p(l —z) =i(l—m). Thus
_i(l_m) (9)
(1 —z)
In this case the cost of capital depends on the personal tax rates which in
general differ for stockholders according to their tax brackets. Therefore,
the firm would have to equalize the net return to all these investors.
However, we can hypothesize a single representative investor or a "Miller
equilibrium", where the high tax investors hold equity and the low tax ones
hold debt only.2 Since neither assumption conforms with reality, we
calculate the cost of capital for retained earnings using the weighted
averages of the parameters in equation (9), where the weights are the
shareownership proportions of the different investors.
Having summarized the model, we can now examine two alternative
assumptions about arbitrage that are employed in this paper. First, the
fixed—p case makes no assumption about arbitrage. We assume that all
hypothetical projects yield the same pretax rate of return, and we compute
the posttax return to savers for each project. In general, these posttax
returns differ across projects. This approach emphasizes the differences in
the tax treatment of different investments, and it provides a clear picture
of the incentives offered by the tax system. Naturally, we would expect
funds to flow from the low yield (high tax) assets towards the high yield
(low tax) ones. This reallocation of capital among the various projects
would continue until an equilibrium is established in which there exist no
2See Miller (1977), and Auerbach and King (1983).-8-
further opportunities for mutually profitable transactions. In a second set
of assumptions, called the fixed—r case, we therefore assume that the real
rates of return on all projects are equalized for all investors before
personal taxes. Differences in personal tax rates will still generate
different net rates of return across investors. It must be stressed that
when arbitrage eliminates differences among projects in the real rate of
interest, there must be differences in the pretax rates of return on
different investments. Hence, the tax system distorts the allocation of
resources.
The choice between the fixed—p and the fixed—r distributions of
marginal effective tax rates depends upon whether we are interested in the
tax schedule facing potential investors or in the proportion of marginal
factor income that is taxed away. The fixed—p calculations are a better
guide to the schedule of tax rates levied on different combinations, but it
is the fixed—r distribution of marginal tax rates that would determine the
welfare losses resulting from the distortionary nature of the taxation of
capital income. Also, the weighted averages in the fixed—r case are a
better guide to the ratio of additional taxes paid to additional profits
earned as a result of a small increase in the corporate sector capital
stock. Although we present selected results for both assumptions, we focus
mainly on the fixed-p case. This emphasis corresponds to that in KF, where
the primary interest is in the effects of taxation on the incentives to
invest.
As a practical matter, in the fixed-p case, we take the gross rate of
return, p, to be 10 percent. We then use equation (4) to calculate p which,
through equations (7)—(9), will qive us an interest rate, i, for each case.
Finally, we calculate r as i—lrandsubstitute it into equation (6) to get-9-
the net rate of return. Alternatively, in the fixed—r case, we begin with
an r of 5 percent. Substitution into (6) provides s, substitution into
(7)—(9) provides the discount rate p, and substitution into (4) provides p.
The interaction between inflation and the tax system is one of the most
important aspects of the effects of taxes on savings and investment. The
expected rate of inflation enters into both the p equation (4) and the s
equation (6). In order to accomodate these expectations, we calculate
effective tax rates for three different inflation rates (just as in KF).
First, a zero rate provides a benchmark against which to judge other
figures, and it describes the impact the tax system would have if it were
fully indexed. Second, we look at an inflation rate of ten percent as a
reasonable upper bound for the l980s. Finally, we use 6.77 percent as the
"actual" inflation for the U.S. ,calculatedas the average rate of increase
of the price deflator for consumer and investment goods over the ten year
period 1970—79. We considered updating this figure by calculating the same
average over the period from 1975 to 1985, but the new "actual" inflation
rate turned out to be only about one percentage point lower. Since this
difference is small, we used 6.77 percent again for comparability with
results in ICF.In addition, results for any inflation rate can be
approximated by interpolating between results for inflation rates of zero
and ten.
Each hypothetical investment under consideration is described by a
unique combination of four characteristics. These characteristics include
the asset in which funds are invested, the industry of the project, the way
the project is financed, and the ultimate recipient of the returns. In
turn, there exist three alternatives for each characteristic. More—10—
specifically, the first asset category is machinery, which includes plant,
equipment, and vehicles. The second asset is buildings, and the third asset
is inventories. We are only considering tangible reproducible assets and
thus exclude land, R&D, and other intangible assets.
The first industry is manufacturing, which consists of the SIC industry
numbers 13—64. Second, other industry contains construction,
transportation, communications and utilities. Third, commerce, includes
trade and services and corresponds to SIC numbers 69 and 72—77.
The three sources of finance are debt, which includes both bond issues
and bank borrowing, new share issues, and retained earnings. The three
ownership categories are households, tax—exempt institutions, and insurance
companies. The primary motivation for this three—way ownership
classification is the different tax treatments that they receive, even
though the funds are indirectly owned by households in all cases. The
household category includes the household ownership of funds through taxed
intermediaries such as banks. The second category includes indirect
tax-exempt ownership through pension funds, the pension business of life
insurance companies and charities. Finally, the third category includes
funds invested as part of contractual savings made by households via the
medium of insurance companies, principally life insurance policies. In
combination, with three assets, three industries, three sources of finance,
and three ownership categories, there exist a total of 81 combinations of
distinct investments that are examined.
In section IV we compute the marginal effective tax rate for each
combination as well as their distribution. In order to plot the
distribution of tax rates, we need to know the proportion of investment
identified with any given combination. We assume that the marginal increase—11—
in investment under consideration is proportional to the existing
distribution of net capital stocks among assets and industries. Further, we
assume that the saving required to finance investment is proportional to the
existing ownership patterns. This enables us to determine the weights that
apply to each combination. Thus, by aggregating with the appropriate
weights, we can calculate marginal effective tax rates for every subset of
investment projects.
To illustrate, let k denote a particular combination involving debt
financed investment. There are 27 such combinations. If cEk denotes the
weight applicable to the kth combination, we can calculate effective tax
rates for capital income generated by debt financed investments in the
following way. The mean tax wedge for this subset is,
(10)
Then the marginal effective tax rate is
(11)
p
In a similar way, we compute the rates for all the other subsets. By
using the weights for all 81 combinations together, we get the overall mean
marginal effective tax rate.—12—
III. Data and Parameters
There have been two major tax reform acts in the 1980s that have
affected the treatment of the various assets and the distortions introduced
by the tax system. The Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA)of 1981 reduced
personal rates and assigned lifetimes for assets to a smallernumber of
classes. These lifetimes were shorter for the most part, so the present
value of depreciation allowances were greater. The Tax Reform Act (TRA)of
1986 reduced personal rates, decreased the statutory corporate rate from
0.46 to 0.34, and repealed the investment tax credit. In the interim years,
a few other adjustments of the tax code took place. All these policy
changes will be described below.
The capital stock weights are derived from Jorgenson and Sullivan
(1981) and Fraumeni and Jorgenson (1980), calculated by the perpetual
inventory method for the year 1977. We use the same weights as thosein KF.
As shown in Table 111.1, about 44 percent of the capital stock is used in
manufacturing, 25 percent is in commerce, and the remaining 31 percent is in
the other industry category. More than half (54 percent) of the total
corporate capital excluding land is in buildings, whereas inventoriesand
equipment share the rest equally.
According to Table 111.2, three—fourths of the financing for
investments in manufacturing comes from retained earnings, and only 20
percent comes from debt.3 These proportions are more equal in commerce(40
percent debt and 55 percent retained earnings) and other industry (48
3WeuseCOMPUSTAT data to calculate market values of debt and equity in each
industry, as described in Gordon and Malkiel (1981) and KF.—13 —
percenteach). These proportions also come from KF, so that we can
replicate the results for 1980 before drawing comparisons to later years.4
The proportions of debt and equity holdings of each ownership category
are shown in Table 111.3. Households and tax-exempt institutions hold
almost equal proportions of debt and equity, while insurance companies hold
mostly debt. In order to concentrate on tax changes by themselves, none of
these weighting parameters are allowed to vary during the time period. The
following subsections describe the other parameters and features of the tax
code that do change during the 1980—86 period.
A. The CorDorate Rates
The top federal statutory rate of 0.46 is used for marginal corporate
income for all years until 1986. State corporate taxes are deductible at
the federal level, and the weighted average of the states' top brackets is
6.6 percent. Therefore, ris0.46 +0.066(1—0.46)or 49.5 percent. The
1986 Act lowered the top statutory corporate tax rate to 0.34, so the same
calculation provides a combined rate of 38.3 percent. Although most
corporations do not reach the top statutory rate bracket, the bulk of
corporate capital is held by those that do.
B. Property and Wealth Taxes
Thousands of local jurisdictions each set their own statutory property
tax rates. Using data from the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations, Jorgenson's 1977 capital stock matrix, and estimated tax payments
4The low 5 percent proportion for new share issues reflects Flow of Funds
data on actual financing and is consistent with the low weight on dividend
taxes in the "new view" of Auerbach (1979), Bradford (1981), and King
(1977). New investment might have to use proportionately more new share
issues, however, reflecting the "old view" of dividend taxes.—14—
in 1977, we calculate the following average tax rates for businesses. For
equipment and inventories w is 0.00768, and for structures w is 0.01126.
These rates are assumed to hold for all seven years. In addition, the
personal wealth tax rates (w) are taken to be zero throughout. This
parameter could be used for estate taxes, but these are a very small source
of revenue in the U.S., and the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 raised the
estate tax exemption to $600,000.
C. The Personal Tax Rates
The data on marginal tax rates for households is made available from
the Treasury and the TAXSIM simulations of the NBER.5 The procedures of the
NBER model are described in Feldstein and Frisch (1977) and in Feenberg and
Rosen (1983). Essentially, it weights marginal rates for 25,000 households
by each different source of income. Table 111.4 provides a summary of the
various rates for each year. The first row shows tax rates on wage income
for comparison purposes only. The second row shows the statutory rates
applicable to interest income. These include an additional 0.05 to account
for state taxes. Also, financial intermediaries hold corporate debt but do
not pay interest on demand deposits. Instead, they provide services to
depositors, a forts of return to households that is not subject to tax. We
therefore multiply the combined federal and state rate by the ratio of
interest—bearing direct and indirect loans of households to corporations
5TheTreasuryprovided estimates of the household rates for all seven
years. However, for comparability with KF we want to use the TAXSIM rate
for 1980. We therefore use the Treasury estimates to indicate how the 1980
TAXSIM rate would change over the period. That is, later years' Treasury
numbers were multiplied by the ratio of the TAXSIM rate for 1980 to the
Treasury rate for 1980.—15—
divided by total direct and indirect loans of households to corporations.
This ratio was calculated to be 0.8738 in KF.° Implicit here is the
assumption that the same rate of interest applies both to borrowing and
lending. To take an example, for 1980, the federal rate on interest of
households was .275, and the combined federal and state rate was 32.5
percent. With the adjustment for banks, m is 0.285 as shown in the table.
In 1981 it became 25.8 percent and, under the TRA, 22.4 percent. The third
row in the Table 111.4 shows that the combined statutory rate for dividends
in 1980 is 47.5 percent, decreased significantly in 1981 and again in 1986.
The statutory capital gains rate from the TAXSIM model for 1980 is 28
percent, but KF uses a 14 percent rate to account for step—up of basis at
death and the selective realization of losses and gains. Also, capital
gains are taxed only upon realization and thus offer a deferral advantage
that depends on the average length of the holding period. As explained in
KF (see pp. 23—24 and 222), the 14 percent rate is approximately halved due
to this advantage.
The effective marginal tax rate on nonprofit institutions is assumed to
be zero. The reason is that contributions to retirement accounts are not
taxable at personal rates. Since savings and interest earnings are taxed
when retirement income is paid out, the treatment is equivalent to a
consumption tax provided the individual remains in the same bracket.
Contributions to nonqualified accounts are relatively small, and the
6Two other alternative adjustments have been suggested but are not used
here. The first takes explicit account of the interest ceiling on time
deposits. The other was put forth by Feldstein and Summers (1979). Both of
these are described in detail in KF.—16 —
taxationof interest income can be postponed until retirement. In this case
the present value of those tax payments is very small.
The taxation of income received through insurance companies follows
some complicated procedures described in KF (pp. 227—234). For our
purposes, the tax rates for the years 1980 through 1983 are shown in Table
111.5 to be 6.9 percent for dividends, 28 percent statutory rate for
retained earnings, and 0.149 +3.88wfor debt, where ir is the inflation
rate. In 1984 the complicated procedures were replaced by a simple 20
percent exclusion, so the effective rate on interest income is 80 percent of
the statutory 46 percent tax rate. Thus, it is taxed at 0.368, and the
dependence on inflation is e1iminated. The following year that rate
remained the salue, and in 1986 the 20 percent exclusion was repealed when
the statutory rate was lowered for all corporations to 34 percent.
Intercorporate dividends receive an 80 percent deduction from the corporate
rate in 1986, and are thus taxed at 6.8 percent. The special rate for
capital gains was repealed.
D. Investment Tax Credits
All qualifying equipment and public utility structures received a
statutory investment tax credit (ITC) of 10 percent in 1980. Two—thirds of
that credit was allowed for equipment with a 5 or 6 year life, and one—third
was allowed for equipment with a 3 or 4 year life. As shown in Table 111.6,
under ERTA the rate for autos increased from 0.033 to 0.06, while all other
equipment received the full 10 percent ITC. The Tax Reform Act of 1986
repeals the ITC altogether. We assume that the companies under
consideration have enough taxable profits to enable them to use those—17--
credits, although in fact many companies do not.7 Since the whole investment
outlay qualifies for tax credit, the parameter f3 is set to one.
E. Inventory Accounting
United States corporations are allowed to use any number of consistent
accounting methods including Last—in First—out (LIFO) and First—in First—out
(FIFO), but they are obligated to use the same method for profits reported
to shareholders as they use for profits reported to the taxing authorities.
In an environment with no inflation, the two methods yield identical figures
and the choice between them should leave the firm indifferent. With
inflation, however, FIFO profits appear to be higher than LIFO. Therefore,
although firm managers might like to report FIFO profits to shareholders,
taxes can be reduced by reporting LIFO profits to the IRS. Of the possible
values that exist for our parameter, v, we set it equal to zero, assuming
that firms act so as to minimize their tax liability. This assumption is
consistent with the use of minimum lifetimes and maximum acceleration in the
depreciation of assets, discussed below.
F. Depreciation Allowances
Estimates of the actual economic depreciation of the different assets
are provided by Hulten and Wykoff (1981) and are shown in Table 111.7.
These are carefully distinguished from the tax lifetimes that are also shown
for each year in Table 111.7. The first twenty assets will be aggregated to
form our machinery category, while the next fourteen assets will form our
7See, for example, Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981). For the effects of
imperfect loss offsets, see Auerbach (1986) or Mayer (1986).—18—
buildings category. Inventories are not shown in this table because they do
not depreciate.
The lifetimes reported for 1980 stem from the estimates of the
midpoints of the Asset Depreciation Range (ADR) found in Jorgenson and
Sullivan (1981). More specifically, the ADR system allowed 20 percent
longer or shorter lives for equipment (assets 1 —20)and public utility
structures (assets 27 —31).Because of our assumption of optimizing tax
practice, these assets are assigned lives that are 80 percent of ADR
midpoints except where the use of a longer lifetime would reduce effective
taxes through eligibility for a higher investment tax credit. Hence, these
lifetimes are consistent with the ITC vector, shown for 1980 in Table 111.6
column one, in that the three— and five—year assets get one—third and two—
thirds of the full ITC, respectively.
Under the 1980 law, also, equipment and public utility structures were
allowed double declining balance (DDB) with a switch to sum—of—the—years—
digits (SYD).8 Other structures (assets 21—26 and 32—34) received 150
percent declining balance with a switch to straight line. Since capital
consumption allowances are based on historical cost, we use the nominal
after tax discount rate, p, to calculate their present value, A. This
calculation accounts for the half year convention, annual allowances, and
continuous discounting (see KF pp. 210—211).
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 introduced the Accelerated Cost
Recovery System (ACRS) under which any depreciable asset fell into one of
four classes and is given a tax life of three, five, ten, or fifteen years.
These lifetimes, which are shown in Table 111.7 column three, assigned a
8This combination is used here as tax—minimizing practice because it can
be shown to provide the earliest possible depreciation deductions. See
Shoven and Bulow (1975).—19 —
three-yearlife to autos, a five—year life to other equipment, a ten-year
life to some gas and other public utility structures, and a fifteen—year
life to railroads, telephone and telegraph, electric light and power, and
all other structures. Machinery and public utilities were to receive DDB
switching to SYD, as before, but depreciation was moved up from the last
half year. As a result, the three-year class depreciated in only 2.5 years,
the five-year class in 4.5 years, and so on. Other structures received 175
percent declining balance still switching to straight line.
In 1982, allowances for machinery and public utilities were cut back to
150percent declining balance, switching to straight line rather than SYD.
Further, the 1982 act decreased the depreciation basis by half of the
investment tax credit. Other changes in 1984 and 1985 lengthened lifetimes
for structures and are shown in Table 111.7. In 1986, autos were moved from
3 to 5 years, and some other assets were moved from 5 to 7 or 10 years, but
the depreciation method was accelerated to DDB. Some long—lived assets such
as public utility structures received 15 or 20 years with 150 percent
declining balance, while nonresidential structures got 31.5 year straight
line.
All these changes in the tax laws are captured in the respective A
parameters for each of the 34 assets. These values are then weighted
appropriately to obtain the aggregate depreciation allowances for each of
our three categories.9 As explained earlier, each A is multiplied by the
statutory corporate tax rate, T, to provide the tax savings Ad. Finally,
the parameter f1 is set to one, indicating that all equipment and structures
9Appendix D of King and Fullerton (1984) describes how we weight the 34
values of A to the three categories.—20—
depreciate for tax purposes as described above, and f2 is set to zero to
indicate no immediate free depreciation of investment.
IV. The Results
Our primary findings for each year concern the fixed—p calculations for
the standard inflation rate of 6.77 percent. For 1980 the overall weighted
marginal effective tax rate on corporate capital income in the United States
is 37 percent. As anticipated, this figure matches exactly the one found in
KF. The interpretation is that if all, assets started with a gross return of
10 percent, and if all capital of all owners were increased by one dollar,
then the present value of the expected tax would be 37 percent of the
additional return. It is noteworthy that this effective rate is less than
the 46 percent statutory corporate tax rate, because the effective rate
incorporates many factors that tend to offset or increase overall taxes.
Table IV.l shows the breakdown of this effective tax rate by asset,
industry, source of finance, and ownership category, for the three inflation
rates. The bottom row shows that the overall effective rate increases
somewhat with inflation, from 32 percent with zero inflation to 38.5 percent
with 10 percent inflation. To help explain this relationship, look at the
rates that correspond to the source of finance categories. The effective
rates for new shares and retained earnings increase steeply with inflation
since the returns are taxed in nominal terms, but debt financed investment
is subsidized at rates that also increase with inflation. This subsidy
arises because corporations can deduct nominal interest at a 49.5 percent
rate while recipients include it at a much lower 23.6 percent rate (averaged—21—
over the three owners). The overall rates at the bottom of the table weigh
the rates for the three sources of finance according to the proportions
described in section III, so the two effects of inflation offset each other.
Under the fully phased—in 1981 law, the overall effective rate for
actual inflation is shown in Table IV.2 to be a much lower 23.5 percent.
This reduction is attributed primarily to two sources. First, an across the
board reduction in personal tax rates was instituted by ERTA in an effort to
stimulate the economy. Second, there was a considerable reduction in the
depreciation lifetimes. As a result of these two factors plus the use of
double declining balance and the ITC, equipment receives a subsidy of 8.5
percent. In addition, structures were previously taxed at 41.2 percent but
under 1981 law are taxed at only 27.8 percent. A less significant decline
to 44.4 percent occurred for inventories. As pointed out by Fullerton and
Henderson (1984), the Economic Recovery Tax Act implied substantially
disparate tax treatments for depreciable assets on the one hand, and for
land and inventories on the other.
In 1982, the method of depreciation was cut back to 150 percent of
declining balance for equipment and public utility structures, as reflected
in the higher effective tax rates for machinery and structures shown in
Table IV.3. Equipment moved from a 8.5 percent subsidy to an 8 percent tax,
and structures increased to 31 percent. Inventories, which do not
depreciate, were unaffected. As expected, then, the rates for all the
different category breakdowns are higher. In particular, the "other
industry" group moves from a small subsidy in 1981 to a 9.7 percent tax in
1982 because it includes public utilities. Thus the overall rate increased
to 29 percent in 1982. Since there were no further changes the next year,
the same rates are also applicable to 1983.—22--
In evaluating the effects of the changes that took place in 1984, it
helps initially to look at the first column in Table IV.4 for the rates at
zero inflation. We want to abstract from the effect of inflation because
the tax rate on interest income earned by insurance companies through 1983
depended explicitly on the rate of inflation. We find that all the
effective rates have increased from the previous year for two reasons.
First, the tax lifetimes for most structures were increased from 15 to 18
years, thus reducing the present value of the depreciation allowances for
these assets. Second, the tax rate on interest income earned by insurance
companies rose to 36.8 percent. In addition, its previous dependence on the
rate of inflation was eliminated. Hence, moving to the rates under actual
inflation, we see that both the rate for insurance companies and the overall
rate have fallen from the previous year, to 14 and 28.4 percent,
respectively.
The results for 1985 are very similar to those in 1984, but slightly
higher as seen in Table IV.5. The reason is that the lifetimes of all
structures besides public utilities were extended to 19 years.
Consequently, the effective tax rates for machinery and inventories remained
the same, whereas the rate for structures rose to 31.4 percent. This change
pushed the overall rate for 1985 to 28.6 percent.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced the differences in the tax treatment
of the various assets. In that spirit, the investment tax credit was
repealed. The statutory corporate rate was decreased to 34 percent, and the
lifetimes for most assets were lengthened. In the fixed—p case of Table
IV.6, these changes translate into much higher effective tax rates for
machinery, a smaller dispersion among the rates of the three asset classes,
and an overall rate of 42 percent. It is interesting that, for the first—23 —
timein the seven years we examined, the overall effective rate is higher
than the statutory corporate rate. That is, largely because of ITC repeal,
the combination of corporate taxes and personal taxes is now greater than
the corporate rate by itself.
As seen in Table IV.6, the returns to debt financed investments are now
taxed rather than subsidized, at low inflation rates, because corporations
deduct interest at a much lower corporate tax rate. This effect is
partially offset by the smaller reduction in the personal rates on interest
income. The effective rates for new share issues fell a little due to the
lower statutory rates on dividends of households and insurance companies,
while capital gains face a higher effective rate than before.
Calculations for the fixed—r case in 1985 and 1986 are shown in Tables
111.7 and 111.8.10 These results show effective tax rates for an equilibrium in
which investors have been allowed to adjust their behavior in response to
the various incentives. As such, these rates become more relevant in
assessing the welfare loss due to the taxation of capital income.The
rates for 1985 in Table IV.7 are higher than in the fixed—p case, for almost
every breakdown, but the same pattern persists. Debt is still subsidized at
rates that grow rapidly with inflation, and machinery is still taxed at
lower rates than the other assets. Effects of the 1986 law are also similar
to those in the fixed—p case. For 1986 compared to 1985, an overall rate of
50 percent instead of 42 implies an additional intertemporal distortion that
has to be weighed against the welfare gains arising from the more equal
treatment of the different assets."
10 These results are comparable to those found in Fullerton (1987) for the
individual arbitrage case.
'1One could calculate Harberger (1966) triangles and measure the welfare
loss due to the distortion in the allocation of resources between the
corporate and the noncorporate sector, or between machinery and buildings.—24—
One very interesting and important aspect of this study is not
demonstrated in the calculations presented thus far. The overall effective
tax rates conceal the distribution of individual tax rates within each year.
To illustrate these differences, we present histograms for the fixed—p case
and the actual inflation rate for 1985 and 1986. Figure IV.l shows the
histogram for 1985, where the height of each bar is the sum of the capital
stock weights for any individual combinations that are taxed at effective
rates falling in each 10 percent interval between —120 and +100 percent.'2 We
find that 22.6 percent of the capital stock is subsidized, while 32 percent
of the capital stock is taxed at rates 80 percent or higher. The highest
subsidy in 1985 is 114.7 percent, received by investment projects in assets
in the "other industry" category, financed by debt sold to tax—exempt
insitutions.
The histogram for 1986 shown is in Figure IV.2. An important point is
that the dispersion is much smaller in 1986. This result suggests a
considerable reduction in the distortions introduced by the tax system.
Also, in 1985 the largest fraction of capital income, 28.6 percent, was
taxed at rates that fell between 70 and 80 percent. In 1986, despite the
increase in the overall mean effective tax rates, the largest fraction of
capital, 26.7 percent, is now taxed at rates that fall between 60 and 70
percent. In other words, the increase in the overall average comes from
reducing subsidies on some capital rather than from increasing the tax on
most capital.
Examples include Cravelle (1982), Shoven (1976), or Fullerton, Shoven, and
Whalley (1983).
histogram for 1985 is fairly representative of all the preceding
years as well. A histogram for 1980 is presented in KF.—25—
Finally, we look at the effects of inflation on the effective tax
rates. Figure IV.3 shows how the overall rate changes as the rate of
inflation varies from zero to ten percent in the years 1980, 1985, and 1986.
The rates for 1980 and 1986 lie everywhere above the rate for 1985, and
exhibit a moderate tendency to rise with inflation. The schedule for 1985 is
almost flat.
However, these schedules are weighted averages of the various
categories and thus suppress the considerable variation of rates among
categories. To illustrate, we present figures to show the sensitivity of
the rates for each of the three assets with respect to inflation. Figure
IV.4 shows that in 1985 the difference among the rates for the three assets
is very big at low rates of inflation. This difference decreases with
inflation. The rate for machinery rises, while the rate for buildings
remains the same and the rate for inventories falls slightly.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 brought the rates for the three assets very
close together. As seen in Figure IV.5, these rates differ much less than
in 1985 when there is no inflation, and they tend to converge as the rate of
inflation increases to ten percent. Once again, we see that the effect of
the reform was to eliminate much of the interasset distortion.
V. Concluding Remarks
We examined the tax laws that affected capital income in the corporate
sector of the U.S. economy from 1980 to 1986. We estimated marginal
effective tax rates for hypothetical investment projects during that period
in order to quantify the incentive effects of the tax system. From the—26 —
plethoraof numbers presented thus far, one can easily lose sight of the
important questions that we have been able to answer. We therefore
summarize the major findings of this study.
Focusing on the overall effective rates under actual inflation in the
fixed—p case, we saw that they started at around 37 percent in 1980,
remained almost ten percentage points lower until 1986, and then rose back
to 42 percent. It would appear that in 1981, when the rates were lowest,
the tax system created a more favorable environment for investment and
caused fewer intertemporal distortions than in any other year. However, the
histograms provided in Figures IV.l and IV.2 suggest that the distribution
of rates needs to be evaluated as well.
When a substantial proportion of the capital stock is being subsidized
at different rates, as it was in 1985, there may be considerable
misallocation of resources and biased economic growth. This misallocation
could imply substantial welfare losses. In 1986, the tax rates were
distributed more uniformly and hence may have removed a welfare loss.
In addition, we found that equipment constantly received a more
favorable tax treatment than the other assets because of the investment tax
credit, until 1986. Debt financing was subsidized because of the
deductibility of interest payments by corporations. Repeal of the ITC and
reduction of the corporate tax rate in 1986 helped reverse both of these
differences.
Capital income accruing to insurance companies was taxed at rates that
increased steeply with inflation. That effect was eliminated in 1984. In
general, the overall effective tax rates do not show much sensitivity to the
rate of inflation. However, this insensitivity is still the result of
offsetting effects. Without indexation of depreciation or interest income,—27 —
inflationstill serves to raise the effective taxrateon assets depreciated
on a historical cost basis and to lower the effective tax rate on assets
financed by issuing debt.Table 111.1
Proportions of Corporate Capital Stock by Asset andIndustry
Asset
Sector
Total Manufacturing OtherIndustry Commerce
Machinery .0867 .0965 .0415 .2247
Buildings .2167 .1970 .1248 .5385
Inventories .1350 .0176 .0842 .2368
Total .4384 .3111 .2502 1.0000
Source: King and Fullerton (1984). Aggregation from unpublished data described
in Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981) and in Frauineni and Jorgenson (1980).Table 111.2






Manufacturing .1981 .0592 .7427 1.000
Other industry .4847 .0381 .4772 1.000
Conimerce .3995 .0443 .5562 1.000
Source: King and Fullerton (1984), as derived and described in the text.Table 111.3






Source: King and Fullerton (1984), as derived and described in the text.Table 111.4
Personal MarginalTaxRatesfor tiousehoidsa
1980 1981-85 1986
Wages .324 .312 .271
Interest'° .285 .258 .224
Dividends .475 .396 .320
Realized Capital Gains .140 .118 .220
a: Combined federal and state marginal tax rates.
b: Tax rates for interest income have been adjusted for financial
intermediation. See text.
Source: Calculations from NBER's tax simulation (TAXSIM) model and the U.S.
Department of Treasury. See section III.C.Table 111.5
Personal Marginal Tax Rates for Insurance Coiipaniesa
1980-83 1984-85 1986
Interest .149+3.88ir .368 .340
Dividends .069 .069 .068
Realized Capital Gains .280 .280 .340
a: Combined federal and state marginal tax rates.
Source: King and Fullerton (1984). See, also, text.Table 111.6
Investment TaxCreditby Asset Class
Asset Class 1980 1981-85 1986
1.Furniture and fixtures 0.100 0.10 0.0
2. Fabricated metal products 0.100 0.10 0.0
3. Engines and turbines 0.100 0.10 0.0
4. Tractors 0.067 0.10 0.0
5. Agricultural machinery 0.100 0.10 0.0
6. Construction machinery 0.100 0.10 0.0
7. Mining and oilfield machinery 0.100 0.10 0.0
8. Metalworking machinery 0.100 0.10 0.0
9. Special industry machinery 0.100 0.10 0.0
10. General industrial machinery 0.100 0.10 0.0
11. Office and computing machinery 0.100 0.10 0.0
12. Service industry machinery 0.100 0.10 0.0
13. Electrical equipment 0.100 0.10 0.0
14. Trucks, buses, and trailers 0.067 0.10 0.0
15. Autos 0.033 0.06 0.0
16. Aircraft 0.100 0.10 0.0
17. Ships and boats 0.100 0.10 0.0
18. Railroad equipment 0.100 0.10 0.0
19. Instruments 0.100 0.10 0.0
20. Other equipment 0.100 0.10 0.0
21. Industrial buildings 0.0 0.0 0.0
22. Commercial buildings 0.0 0.0 0.0
23. Religious buildings 0.0 0.0 0.0
24. Educational buildings 0.0 0.0 0.0
25. Hospitals 0.0 0.0 0.0
26. Other nonfarm buildings 0.0 0.0 0.0
27. Railroads 0.100 0.10 0.0
28. Telephone and telegraph 0.100 0.10 0.0
29. Electric light and power 0.100 0.10 0.0
30. Gas 0.100 0.10 0.0
31. Other public utilities 0.100 0.10 0.0
32. Farm structures 0.0 0.0 0.0
33. Mining, shafts, and wells 0.0 0.0 0.0
34. Other nonresidential structures 0.0 0.0 0.0
Source: Fullerton and Henderson (1984), as described in the text.Table 111.1




Asset Class 1980 1981-83 1984 1985 1986
34. Other nonresidential
structures 0.0290 28.2015.0 18.0 19.0 31.5
and Wykoff (1981).
utility structures (assets 27-31), Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981) provide
estimates based on the Hulten/Wykoff methodology. Lifetimes are from Fullerton
























1.Furniture and fixtures 0.1100 8.00 5.0 5.05.07.0
2. Fabricated metal products 0.0917 10.00 5.0 5.05.07.0
3. Engines and turbines 0.0786 12.48 5.0
4. Tractors 0.1633 5.00 5.0
5. Agricultural machinery 0.0971 8.00 5.0
6.Construction machinery 0.1722 7.92 5.0
7. Mining and oilfield
machinery 0.1650 7.68 5.0
8. Metalworking machinery 0.1225 10.16 5.0
9. Special industry machinery 0.1031 10.16 5.0
10. General industrial machinery0.1225 9.84 5.0
11. Office and computing
machinery 0.2729 8.00 5.0 5.0 5.07.0
12. Service industry machinery 0.1650 8.24 5.0 5.05.07.0
13. Electrical equipment 0.1179 9.92 5.0 5.05.07.0
14. Trucks, buses, and trailers 0.2537 5.00 5.0 5.05.05.0
15. Autos 0.3333 3.00 3.0 3.03.05.0
16. Aircraft 0.1833 7.00 5.0 5.05.05.0
17. Ships and boats 0.0750 14.40 5.0 5.05.010.0
18. Railroad equipment 0.0660 12.00 5.0 5.05.05.0
19. Instruments 0.1473 8.48 5.0 5.05.0 5.0
20. Other equipment 0.1473 8.16 5.0 5.05.05.0
21. Industrial buildings 0.0361 28.8015.0 18.019.031.5
22. Commercial buildings 0.0247 47.6015.0 18.019.031.5
23. Religious buildings 0.0188 48.0015.0 18.019.031.5
24. Educational buildings 0.0188 48.0015.0 18.019.031.5
25. Hospitals 0.0233 48.0015.0 18.019.031.5
26. Other nonfarm buildings 0.0454 30.9015.0 18.019.031.5
27. Railroads 0.0176 24.0015.0 15.015.020.0
28. Telephone and telegraph 0.0333 21.6015.0 15.015.020.0
29. Electric light and power 0.0300 21.6015.0 15.015.020.0
30. Gas 0.0300 19.2010.0 10.010.015.0
31. Other public utilities 0.0450 17.6010.0 10.010.015.0
32. Farm structures 0.0237 25.Q015.0 18.019.020.0
33. Mining, shafts, and wells 0.0563 6.80 5.0 5.05.05.0
Source: Depreciation rates are from Hulten For publicTable IV.l
Marginal Effective Tax Rates for 1980, Fixed-p Case
InflationRate
Zero 10% Actual (6.77%)
Asset
Machinery 3.8 22.8 17.5
Buildings 35.6 41.9 41.2
Inventories 50.9 45.5 47.0
Industry
Manufacturing 44.4 55.1 52.8
Other industry 10.0 15.8 14.6
Commerce 38.0 37.5 38.2
Source of Finance
Debt -1.8 -22.2 -16.2
New share issues 61.1 104.6 91.2
Retained earnings 48.5 66.6 62.4
Owner
Households 44.2 61.9 57.6
Tax-exempt institutions 4.1 -37.2 -21.5
Insurance companies 4.2 44.4 23.4
Overall 32.1 38.5 37.3Table 117.2
MarginalEffective Tax Rates for 1981, Fixed-p Case
InflationRate
Zero 10% Actual (6.77%)
Asset
Machinery -18.1 -4.4 -8.5
Buildings 22.8 28.8 27.8
Inventories 49.8 42.1 44.4
Indus try
Manufacturing 33.8 41.7 40.0
Other industry -4.0 -.1 -1.0
Commerce 25.5 24.8 25.3
Source of Finance
Debt -16.5 -34.8 -29.9
New share issues 51.0 89.1 77.3
Retained earnings 37.5 52.0 48.7
Owner
Households 32.4 45.9 42.6
Tax-exempt institutions -8.6 -46.9 -32.7
Insurance companies -9.6 37.0 13.6
Overall 20.0 24.5 23.5Table IV.3
Marginal Effective TaxRatesfor 1982-1983, Fixed-p Case
InflationRate
Zero 10% Actual (6.77%)
Asset
Machinery -2.1 12.5 8.2
Buildings 26.0 31.7 30.9
Inventories 49.8 42.1 44.4
Industry
Manufacturing 36.6 44.8 43.0
Other industry 6.9 10.4 9.7
Commerce 28.4 27.9 28.4
Source of Finance
Debt -7.9 -26.8 -21.7
New share issues 53.9 92.1 80.4
Retained earnings 41.4 56.1 52.8
Owner
Households 36.9 50.5 47.3
Tax-exempt institutions -1.3 -39.3 -25.2
Insurance companies -1.9 42.1 19.6
Overall 25.3 29.9 29.0Table IV..4
MarginalEffective TaxRatesfor 1984, Fixed-p Case
InflationRate
Zero 10% Actual (6.77%)
Asset
Machinery -1.6 8.9 6.4
Buildings 28.0 30.0 30.9
Inventories 49.9 40.0 43.3
Industry
Manufacturing 37.9 45.4 44.0
Other industry 4.6 6.9
Commerce 30.1 25.0 27.7
Source of Finance
Debt -5.5 -40.8 -28.0
New share issues 54.5 92.8 81.0
Retained earnings 41.9 60.1 55.2
Owner
Households 36.0 49.7 46.2
Tax-exempt institutions -.3 -35.4 -22.6
Insurance companies 18.3 10.4 14.1
Overall 26.5 27.6 28.4Table IV.5
Marginal Effective Tax Rates for 1985, Fixed-p Case
InflationRate
Zero 10% Actual (6.77%)
Asset
Machinery -1.6 8.9 6.4
Buildings 28.5 30.5 31.4
Inventories 49.9 40.0 43.3
Industry
Manufacturing 38.2 45.8 44.3
Other industry 7.6 4.6 6.9
Commerce 30.5 25.4 28.0
Source of Finance
Debt -5.2 -40.6 -27.7
New share issues 54.7 93.0 81.2
Retained earnings 42.1 60.3 55.4
Owner
Households 36.2 49.9 46.4
Tax-exempt institutions .0 -35.1 -22.2
Insurance companies 18.6 10.6 14.4
Overall 26.8 27.9 28.6Table IV.6
MarginalEffectiveTaxRatesfor 1986,Fixed-p Case
InflationRate
Zero 10% Actual (6.77%)
Asset
Machinery 29.6 41.9 38.9
Buildings 38.2 43.3 43.1
Inventories 44.2 41.7 42.8
Industry
Manufacturing 43.9 53.1 51.1
Other industry 28.8 30.9 31.3
Commerce 37.9 38.8 39.5
Source of Finance
Debt 17.4 -1.7 5.5
New share issues 53.3 84.0 74.7
Retained earnings 47.6 63.7 59.6
Owner
Households 43.9 58.0 54.4
Tax-exempt institutions 19.5 -3.1 5.5
Insurance companies 34.2 35.9 36.3
Overall 37.7 42.6 42.1Table IV.7
Marginal Effective Tax Rates for 1985, Fixed-r Case
InflationRate
Zero 10% Actual (6.71%)
Asset
Machinery -28.6 21.7 12.9
Buildings 35.7 46.2 45.2
Inventories 53.9 48.7 50.8
Industry
Manufacturing 43.9 56.6 54.1
Other industry 9.9 14.8 16.4
Commerce 37.7 37.3 39.0
Source of Finance
Debt -2.3 -491.5 -129.3
New share issues 56.1 80.5 75.9
Retained earnings 44.5 64.0 59.9
Owner
Households 43.3 69.7 63.1
Tax-exempt institutions 9.4 -40.0 -21.9
Insurance companies 22.5 -.7 11.6
Overall 34.4 42.8 41.9Table IV.8
MarginalEffectiveTaxRatesfor 1986, Fixed-r Case
InflationRate
Zero 10% Actual (6.77%)
Asset
Machinery 35.4 51.7 48.5
Buildings 43.3 52.1 51.2
Inventories 48.1 48.6 48.9
Indus try
Manufacturing 47.6 58.4 56.4
Other industry 35.1 41.4 41.0
Commerce 42.9 47.4 47.3
Source of Finance
Debt 23.0 —25.9 -2.3
New share issues 54.1 74.5 70.3
Retained earnings 49.6 63.9 61.1
Owner
Households 48.7 67.7 63.2
Tax-exempt institutions 26.0 -.7 9.3
Insurance companies 38.1 41.3 41.8
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